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Consolidated Edison Company of New York v. Public
Service Commission: Freedom of Speech
Extended to Monopolies-Is There No Escape
for the Consumer?
The author's focus is upon an opinion of the United States Supreme
Court which silently extended first amendment freedoms to a corporate
monopoly. The majority attempts a balancing of the monopoly utility's
freedom of speech against the state's protection of the privacy interests of
the ratepayers and finds the privacy interest not to be so compelling as to
justify any restriction on freedom of speech. The author suggests that the
privacy interest is so substantial as to be compelling and further agrees
with the dissent, that because of the special position of the Consolidated
Edison Company as a monopoly and its rate structure, the ratepayers are
a captive audience who are compelled to subsidize the utility's opinions.
On June 20, 1980, the United States Supreme Court decided the
case of Consolidated Edison Company of New York v. Public
Service Commission of New York.' With this decision, the Court
extended full first amendment protection to the free speech of a
corporate monopoly despite the resulting encroachment upon the
privacy interest of its captive consumers.
The Consolidated Edison Company of New York is a public util-
ity permitted to operate as a monopoly under the laws of the
State of New York.2 As such, it is under the regulatory jurisdic-
tion of the Public Service Commission of New York.3 New York
law gives the Public Service Commission broad supervisory pow-
ers over all real and personal property "used or to be used for or
in connection with or to facilitate the generation, transmission,
distribution, sale or furnishing of electricity for light, heat or
power,"4 as well as giving it power over the contents of everything
which goes into the billing envelope.5
In January 1976, Consolidated Edison placed an insert in its
billing envelope expressing the corporation's opinion on nuclear
1. 100 S. Ct. 2326 (1980).
2. N.Y. PuB. SERv. LAw § 68 (McKinney 1955).
3. N.Y. PuB. SERv. LAw § 64 (McKinney 1955).
4. N.Y. PuB. SERv. LAw § 2.12 (McKinney 1955).
5. N.Y. PUB. SERv. LAw § 66.12-a (McKinney Supp. 1980-81) provides in part:
The commission shall: "Have power to fix and alter the format and informational
requirements of bills utilized by public and private gas and electric corporations in
levying charges for service ......
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power and its benefits.6 In March 1976, the Natural Resources De-
fense Council, Inc. (NRDC) requested that Consolidated Edison
enclose a rebuttal in their next billing envelope. Consolidated
Edison refused.
NRDC then petitioned the Public Service Commission to use its
jurisdiction to compel Consolidated Edison to open their billing
envelopes to opposing viewpoints. The Commission denied
NRDC's request but did issue an order prohibiting utilities under
its control from using their billing envelopes to disseminate cor-
porate views on controversial issues of public importance. In its
Statement of Policy on Advertising and Promotion Practices of
Public Utilities, 7 the Commission stated that its order was based
on the fact that Consolidated Edison's customers are a captive au-
dience by virtue of the fact that they must receive their electrical
power and their bills from the utility. As such, they should not be
subjected in their homes or offices to Consolidated Edison's be-
liefs. In addition, the Commission noted that the order was predi-
cated upon the fact that there was nothing to indicate that those
very consumers were not being forced to subsidize the controver-
sial inserts through a pass-along of the cost as an operational ex-
pense, or by giving the inserts a "free ride," since they were
included in the billing envelope which, along with postage, was al-
ready included in the utility's rates.8 The Commission, however,
allowed Consolidated Edison to continue sending bill inserts
which did not deal with public policy issues but rather with is-
sues concerning its ratepayers vis-A-vis the service they received
from the utility, based on the rationale that these inserts bene-
fited the ratepayers themselves, not merely the utility.
Consolidated Edison then sought judicial review of the order of
the Public Service Commission banning utilities from using bill
inserts to express their views. The Commission's order was af-
firmed by the New York Court of Appeals,9 and on appeal to the
United States Supreme Court, the Court reversed on the ground
that the Commission's order impermissibly infringed on Consoli-
dated Edison's constitutionally protected speech since the ban
was based only on content and was, therefore, invalid. The major-
ity glossed over the reality that because Consolidated Edison is
6. The January 1976 billing envelope "stated Consolidated Edison's views on
'the benefits of nuclear power,' saying that they 'far outweigh any potential risk'
and that nuclear power plants are safe, economical, and clean." In addition, the
utility contended that increased use of nuclear power would decrease this coun-
try's dependence on foreign energy sources. 100 S. Ct. at 2330.
7. Id.
8. See generally note 58 infra.
9. Consolidated Edison v. Public Service Commission, 47 N.Y.2d 94, 390
N.E.2d 749, 417 N.Y.S.2d 30 (1979).
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the kind of monopoly from which there is no practical escape,
holding its customers as a captive audience in their own homes,
substantial privacy rights are thereby invaded.' 0
Justice Blackmun's dissent, with Justice Rehnquist joining in
part, protested that by virtue of the position of Consolidated
Edison as a state-created monopoly, extensive supervision on the
part of the state is justified" to protect the utility's ratepayers
from invasion of their constitutional right of freedom of associa-
tion. The dissent was concerned with the ratepayers' compelled
association with the utility's beliefs and the forced subsidy they
are subjected to because of the utility's particular rate structure.
This note will review the opinion of the Court and that of the
dissenting justices. In addition there will be a discussion of what
the outcome might have been had the majority, like the dissent,
applied legitimate concerns for the privacy and associational
rights of Consolidated Edison's customers to the realities of the
particular case. If the Court had looked at Consolidated Edison
as a service monopoly rather than as an ordinary business corpo-
ration, this author believes that the Court would, and should,
10. The Court has consistently held that the home is a citadel of privacy. See,
e.g., Stanley v. Georgia, 394 U.S. 557 (1969), in which the Court found a statute un-
constitutional which purported to make criminal the possession of obscene mate-
rial wherever it is found, even in one's own home. "[TIhe States retain broad
power to regulate obscenity; that power simply does not extend to mere posses-
sion by the individual in the privacy of his own home. See also notes 79-87 infra
and accompanying text.
11. As a general rule monopolies are contrary to the public policies of the
State of New York. See, e.g., N.Y. GEN. Bus. LAW § 340 (McKinney 1968); Baker v.
Walter Reade Theatres, Inc., 37 Misc.2d 172, 173, 377 N.Y.S.2d 795, 796 (1962) in
which the New York Supreme Court, Special Term, held that the objective of § 340
was to ensure "free competition in the business, trade or commerce of the furnish-
ing of any service in this State ...... Utilities, however, are excepted from the
general rule and for that reason the State of New York created the Public Service
Commission, N.Y. PUB. SERV. LAW § 4 (McKinney Supp. 1980-81), and gave it juris-
diction over these utilities. N.Y. PUB SERV. LAW § 5 (McKinney Supp. 1980-81).
"Private electrical companies are protected in New York State from unlicensed
competition .... however, their monopolistic control of the desired service is in
turn subjected to the regulatory powers of the Commission." Rochester Gas and
Electric Corp. v. Public Service Commission, 414 N.Y.S.2d 754, 756, 66 A.D.2d 509,
512 (1979).
In Radio Common Carriers of New York v. Public Service Commission, 79
Misc.2d 600, 603, 360 N.Y.S.2d 552, 555 (1974), it was held that:
The PSC is charged with the responsibility of administering the Public
Service Law and its determination of the applicability of that law to those
areas of comunication assigned to it for regulation will not be set aside by
the courts if there is a rational basis for the conclusions reached.
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have enunciated new rules restricting the first amendment pro-
tection given to monopolies.
I. THE MAJORrrY's ANALYSIS
The majority based their rationale on the traditional, time-
honored tenets of prior first amendment content-based regulation
decision.12 Those decisions require that the state show a compel-
ling interest before it limits first amendment rights and balance
that interest against all competing interests presented by the spe-
cific facts of the case before it.13
Justice Powell, writing the opinion of the Court, noted that the
first and fourteenth amendments of the United States Constitu-
tion guarantee that no state shall "abridg[e] the freedom of
speech .... " State action14 is assumed since the Public Service
Commission is a regulatory agency sanctioned by the State of
12. The Court has consistently held that first amendment guarantees hold a
preferred position in relation to other constitutional guarantees because it holds
within it rights essential to a free society. See, e.g., First National Bank of Boston
v. Bellotti, 435 U.S. 765 (1978); see note 4, infra, in which full protection of the First
Amendment guarantee of free speech was accorded business corporations; Police
Department v. Mosley, 408 U.S. 92 (1972), in which the Court held that picketing
may be regulated only as to time, place, or manner; Tinker v. Des Moines School
District, 393 U.S. 503 (1969) in which it was held that absent a showing of material
and substantial interference with discipline, school officials may not constitution-
ally prohibit the expression of particular opinions by students. The problem with
deciding the case on these principles is that the Court is totally ignoring the fact
that a monopoly differs vastly from an individual or a corporation. A monopoly is
necessarily more prone toward excesses and exploitation, and thus has been more
closely watched and regulated across the board. See, e.g., the Sherman Act, 15
U.S.C. §§ 1-7 (1976), the purpose of which is to prevent those practices which cre-
ate monopolies suppressing or restricting competition and obstructing the course
of trade. Based on the contention that monopolies have consistently been closely
regulated and should continue to be so regulated, this Author believes that in this
case the Court should have enunciated an entirely new set of first amendment val-
ues to be placed on the speech of monopolies; giving them a guarantee of freedom
of speech which is restricted in such a way as to prevent exploitation and over-
reaching.
13. The Court applied a compelling state interest test to the first amendment
claim of Consolidated Edison rather than making a reasonable balancing of that
interest against the state's interests in protecting its citizens, the utility's ratepay-
ers, against a compelled subsidy of the utility's political and social beliefs and an
invasion by the utility of the sanctity of their homes. See note 29 and accompany-
ing text infra. The compelling state interest test requires the state to show that
there are legitimate, important interests to be protected and that there is no rea-
sonable alternate way to promote that state end.
14. Freedom of speech is included in the rights guaranteed by the first amend-
ment which, in turn, is part of the Bill of Rights. When the Bill of Rights was
adopted it was perceived as a limitation of federal encroachment, not a limitation
on encroachment of individual liberties by the states.
In 1868 the Fourteenth Amendment was adopted providing in part that a state
may not "deprive any person of life, liberty or property, without due process of
law." Through judicial interpretation most of the Bill of Rights has gradually been
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New York15 with a broad range of powers. 16 Thus, any action
taken by the Commission is impliedly taken by the State. 17
In First National Bank of Boston v. Bellotti,18 the Court ex-
tended the right of freedom of speech to corporations. In a prior
decision, Virginia State Board of Pharmacy v. Virginia Citizens
Consumer Council,19 the Court had extended freedom of speech
to corporations only so far as their commercial speech, but did
not place the commercial speech in the same esteemed position
as individual speech.20 The Court in Bellotti extended a corpora-
tion's protected speech to include the corporation's opinions on
all topics, holding that just as in the case of the individual, no
state may prohibit a business corporation from expressing its
made applicable to the states by the due process clause of the Fourteenth Amend-
ment.
In Palko v. Connecticut, 302 U.S. 319 (1937), Mr. Justice Cardozo speaking for the
Court recognized that "[I] mmunities that are valid as against the federal govern-
ment by force of the specific pledges of particular amendments have been found to
be implicit in the concept of ordered liberty, and thus, through the fourteenth
amendment, become valid as against the states." Id. at 324-25 (citations omitted).
The First Amendment has been found to come within the Fourteenth Amend-
ment's scope in Gitlow v. New York, 268 U.S. 652 (1925). The Court held that a
statute which punished advocacy of an overthrow of government by force was con-
stitutional. In dictum, however, the Court said, "[W]e may and do assume that
freedom of speech and of press-which are protected by the First Amendment
from abridgment by Congress--are among the fundamental rights and 'liberties'
protected by the due process clause of the Fourteenth Amendment from impair-
ment by the States." Id. at 666.
In Stromberg v. California, 283 U.S. 359 (1931), the Court struck down a statute
which condemned displaying a red flag in a public place or meeting place stating,
"It has been determined that the conception of liberty under the due process
clause of the Fourteenth Amendment embraces the right of free speech ... The
right is not an absolute one, and the State in the exercise of its police power may
punish the abuse of this freedom." Id. at 368.
15. See note 3 supra and accompanying text.
16. See note 4 supra and accompanying text.
17. See, e.g., Radio Common Carriers of New York v. Public Service Comm'n,
79 Misc. 2d 600, 360 N.Y.S.2d 552 (1974).
18. 435 U.S. 765 (1978). In Bellotti the Court held a Massachusetts statute vio-
lative of the First Amendment because it purported to prevent corporate manage-
ment from using corporate funds to publish views on political and social issues
which had no effect on the business of the corporation. This differs from the pres-
ent case in that Consolidated Edison is not using corporate funds but moneys
taken from its reasonable rate of return which comes from its ratepayers, and not
from the corporate treasury.
19. 425 U.S. 748 (1976).
20. Id. Prior to the decision in Virginia State Board of Pharmacy, commercial
speech had not been given first amendment protection. The Court concluded,
however, that while commercial speech was to be accorded this protection, "some
forms of commercial speech regulation are surely permissible." 425 U.S. at 770.
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views on any specified issue, political or otherwise.2 '
Since the Public Service Commission's ban on bill inserts lim-
ited the means by which Consolidated Edison could "participate
in the public debate on [nuclear power] and other controversial
issues of national importance, '22 the Court found that based on
its prior decision in Bellotti,23 the ban "strikes at the heart of the
freedom to speak."24 The majority then addressed first amend-
ment issues, giving a rather cursory review to the interests of the
utility's consumers which the ban had sought to protect. But
when there are competing substantive rights, often a balancing of
the interests is made.25 The majority attempted such a balancing
test, but the scales seemed to be weighted in favor of Consoli-
dated Edison's right to free speech. The Court merely held that
the privacy rights involved were not substantial26 and dismissed
the Public Service Commission's argument that the distribution
of bill inserts amounted to a forced subsidy. They claimed that
21. The majority's reliance on Bellotti is inappropriate. Justice Powell, writing
for the Court in Bellotti noted that Justice White's dissent in that case relied heav-
fly on Abood v. Detroit Board of Education, 431 U.S. 209 (1977), see note 112, infra,
and Machinists v. Street, 367 U.S. 740 (1961), see note 109, infra, decisions which
limited the political speech of unions insofar as they compelled the financial sup-
port through dues of their political beliefs by all of their members whether or not
they agreed with the views expressed. Mr. Justice Powell distinguished these
cases from Bellotti saying, "[tlhe critical distinction here is that no shareholder
has been 'compelled' to contribute anything [toward dissemination of the bank's
opinions ] .... [T] he shareholder invests in a corporation of his own volition and
is free to withdraw his investment at any time and for any reason." 435 U.S. at 794
n. 34. Bellotti can be distinguished from the instant case in much the same way as
were Abood and Machinists v. Street distinguished by Mr. Justice Powell. Be-
cause of the unique relationship between Consolidated Edison and its consumers,
they are compelled to be associated with the utility and, therefore, with its beliefs.
Also, because of its rate structure its consumers are compelled, as a condition of
receiving power in New York City, to finance the bill inserts, a fortiori, the dissem-
ination of Consolidated Edison's political views. See Comment, Utility Rates, Con-
sumers, and the New York State Public Service Commission, 39 ALBANY L. REV.
707, 721-23 (1975); note 56, infra.
22. 100 S. Ct. at 2331.
23. 435 U.S. 765, see note 18, supra.
24. 100 S. Ct. at 2332.
25. The right of free speech has often conflicted with other substantial, funda-
mental rights. In many of the shopping center cases which involved the exercise
of first amendment rights in privately owned shopping centers the picketers' inter-
est in freedom of speech conflicted with property rights of the shopping center
owners. This required a balancing of first amendment rights against rights of own-
ers of private property which had been opened for use by the general public. See,
e.g., PruneYard Shopping Center v. Robins, 447 U.S. 74 (1980); Hudgens v. NLRB,
424 U.S. 507 (1976). In the many cases involving civil rights demonstrations the
marchers' free speech interests conflicted with the municipality's legtimate con-
cern for its citizens. See, e.g., Adderley v. Florida, 385 U.S. 39 (1966); Cox v. Louisi-
ana, 379 U.S. 536 (1965). These cases required the balancing of one interest against
another on the scales of justice and so, too, does the instant case. See also, Hynes
v. Mayor of Oradell, 425 U.S. 610, 616-17 (1976).
26. 100 S. Ct. at 2335. But see, notes 79-87 infra and accompanying text.
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the ban was based entirely on content of the inserts no matter
who was paying for them. 27
Since a limitation on the content of speech is not per se inva-
lid,28 the Court's decision striking down the Commission's ban on
the bill inserts in question rested on consideration of "whether
the prohibition is (i) a reasonable time, place, or manner restric-
tion, (ii) a permissible subject-matter regulation, or (iii) a nar-
rowly tailored means of serving a compelling state interest."29
27. 100 S. Ct. at 2336. But see, 100 S. Ct. at 2340 n.1 (Blackmun, J., dissenting),
in which it is pointed out that the Commission expressly stated in its denial for a
rehearing that its ban was based in part on the compelled association.
28. In Gitlow v. New York, 268 U.S. 652 (1925) the Court stated:
It is a fundamental principle, long established, that the freedom of speech
.. . which is secured by the Constitution, does not confer an absolute
right to speak or publish, without responsibility, whatever one may
choose, or an unrestricted and unbridled license that gives immunity for
every possible use of language and prevents the punishment of those who
abuse this freedom .... Reasonably limited .... this freedom is an ines-
timable privilege in a free government; without such limitation, it might
become the scourge of the republic.
Id. at 666-67. See, e.g., Young v. American Mini Theatres, Inc., 427 U.S. 50 (1976), in
which a zoning ordinance requiring that "adult" motion picture theatres be lo-
cated at least 1,000 feet from any two other "regulated uses" or at least 500 feet
from a residential area was held not violative of the First Amendment even though
the regulation was based upon the content of the films shown at the theatres.
29. 100 S. Ct. at 2332. This breakdown of the analysis the Court is following is
significant since it signals that the compelling state interest test will be applied.
This test puts the burden on the state to prove that it has a substantial interest in
placing a restriction on so important a right. Freedom of speech is "susceptible of
restriction only to prevent grave and immediate danger to interests which the
State may lawfully protect." West Virginia Board of Education v. Barnette, 319
U.S. 624, 639 (1943), in which the Court held that the state did not have a compel-
ling state interest in mandating that all children must pledge allegiance to the flag
at school. The Court could have applied a balancing test of the interests involved
since the interests the state sought to be protected by the ban should have been
accorded the highest level of review as should Consolidated Edison's freedom of
speech, assuming the utility is treated as a corporation as opposed to a monopoly.
See notes 12 and 25 supra. The Courts of the State of New York have ruled that a
regulation promulgated by the Public Service Commission, which is, in fact, within
its jurisdiction to make, "will not be set aside if there is a rational basis for the
conclusion reached." (emphasis supplied). See note 11 supra. This would imply
that a rational basis approach, one in which the regulation is upheld if there is a
legitimate purpose for the regulation and the regulation is a reasonable means to
that end, might be used, but the Court does not even consider this. In United
States v. O'Brien, 391 U.S. 367 (1968), the Court held that the government had a
compelling interest in prohibiting mutilation of draft cards, and set out guidelines
for judging the constitutionality of a government regulation:
[A] governmental regulation is sufficiently justified if it is within the con-
stitutional power of the Government; if it furthers an important or sub-
stantial governmental interest; if the governmental interest is unrelated to
the suppression of free expression; and if the incidental restriction on al-
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The Court applied this compelling state interest test since it be-
lieved that the Commission's ban was entirely content-based 3 0 re-
quiring more careful scrutiny.3' For that reason, the majority
refused to apply a reasonable time, place, or manner test to the
regulation. That test is used where speech is regulated, but not
precluded.32 It is the position of this article that even though the
Court applied the stringent compelling state interest test, it
should not have struck down the Commission's ban on bill in-
serts.
A. Reasonable Time, Place, or Manner Restriction
A reasonable time, place, or manner test is applied when
speech is not proscribed entirely, but the state merely seeks to
regulate the time, place, or manner of the manifestation of the ex-
pression for a valid reason.3 3 A time, place, or manner regulation
is not a restriction which is based solely on content. It serves
both a legitimate governmental interest and leaves open adequate
alternative channels for communication. 34
According to the dissent3 5 and the New York Court of Ap-
leged First Amendment freedoms is no greater than is essential to the fur-
therance of that interest.
Id. at 377.
30. See note 27 supra and accompanying text.
31. 100 S. Ct. at 2332. "[Wlhen regulation is based on the content of the
speech, governmental action must be scrutinized more carefully to ensure that
communication has not been prohibited 'merely because public officials disap-
prove of the speaker's views.'" (Quoting Niemotko v. Maryland, 340 U.S. 268, 282
(1951) (Frankfurter, J., concurring in the result)).
32. See, e.g., Adderly v. Florida, 385 U.S. 39 (1966), in which a statute preclud-
ing demonstrations on property not generally open to the public was upheld as a
valid restriction on time, place, or manner. It was held that since the demonstra-
tors were free to express themselves in other, more appropriate forums the regula-
tion did not violate their first amendment rights.
33. "The essence of time, place or manner regulation lies in the recognition
that various methods of speech regardless of their content, may frustrate legiti-
mate governmental goals .... A restriction that regulates only the time, place or
manner of speech may be imposed so long as its [sic] reasonable." 100 S. Ct. at
2332. See, e.g., Cox v. Louisiana, 379 U.S. 536, 554 (1965), in which the Court over-
turned convictions based on disturbing the peace and obstructing public passages
at an orderly civil rights march as not being a reasonable time, place, or manner
regulation. The Court made clear that "rights of free speech and assembly. . . do
not mean that everyone with opinions or beliefs to express may address a group at
any public place and at any time," but found that the regulation, in this particular
case, went far beyond regulation of time, place, or manner. Id. at 554.
34. See, e.g., Lehman v. City of Shaker Heights, 418 U.S. 298 (1974), note 47 in-
fra. See also, Cox v. New Hampshire, 312 U.S. 569, 574 (1941), in which the Court
upheld a statute requiring paraders to obtain a special license from the city.
"Where a restriction ... is designed to promote the public convenience in the in-
terest of all, it cannot be disregarded by the attempted exercise of some civil right
which in other circumstances would be entitled to protection." Id. at 574.
35. 100 S. Ct. at 2342-43.
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peals,36 the Public Service Commission's ban properly seeks only
to limit the manner in which Consolidated Edison wishes to ex-
press its opinions. The ban covers only inserts placed in the bill-
ing envelopes of the consumers. It does not attempt to preclude
Consolidated Edison from spending its own corporate funds de-
rived solely from profits otherwise available to the corporation's
shareholders, 37 for promulgating its opinions in any other man-
ner. Nor does it truly discriminate as to content, per se.38 No
matter what the utility's view on a particular subject, there will
inevitably be some in its vast audience who will object to that
view. The billing envelope is, therefore, seen by the New York
Court of Appeals 39 and the dissent 40 as simply not being the
proper forum for the utility, or any other group, to express points
of view on controversial issues.
The dissent contended that there were legitimate state interests
involved. The Public Service Commission sought only to exercise
the jurisdiction granted to it by the State of New York for the pur-
pose of regulating the state-sanctioned monopoly.4 1 Since the
state saw fit to grant such a broad latitude of power to the Com-
mission, it can be inferred that it wanted to keep a close watch on
these monopolies to avoid excesses. 42 The dissent felt that the re-
striction placed on Consolidated Edison's speech is a reasonable
one in that it neither seeks to proscribe the utility's speech in
toto, nor does it seek to ban only the utility's opinions from the
rate envelopes. The regulation seeks only to eliminate all opinion
from the improper forum of the rate envelope. 43 It does not seek
36. 47 N.Y.2d at 106, 390 N.E.2d at 755, 417 N.Y.S.2d at 36 (1979).
37. 100 S. Ct. at 2339 (Blackmun, J., dissenting). See also, notes 91 & 105 and
accompanying text infra.
38. See note 28 supra.
39. See note 9 supra.
40. 100 S. Ct. at 2340-41.
41. See note 11 supra.
42. ' This exceptional grant of power to private enterprises justifies extensive
oversight on the part of the State to protect the ratepayers from exploitation of the
monopoly power through excessive rates and other forms of overreaching." 100 S.
Ct. at 2340 (Blackmun, J., dissenting). See also, Rochester Gas and Electric Corp.
v. Public Serv. Comm'n, 414 N.Y.S.2d 754, 66 A.D.2d 509 (1979); Cantor v. Detroit
Edison Co., 428 U.S. 579 (1976), note 61 infra.
43. The improper forum for particular speech was discussed at length in FCC
v. Pacifica Foundation, 438 U.S. 726 (1978), in which a particular monologue by a
comedian which contained both political satire and obscenity was broadcast over
the radio and was held to be patently offensive and indecent by the FCC. The
Court upheld the FCC ruling "even though the monologue would be protected in
other contexts." Id. at 746. This is because a radio broadcast comes into the home
and in the privacy of the home the individual's right to be left alone plainly out-
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to ban the utility from expressing its views in any other more
suitable forum. As such, the Commission's ban could meet the
Court's own criteria of a valid time, place, or manner restriction of
the First Amendment right of free speech."
The Court, however, did not see fit to view the ban as a time,
place, or manner regulation, but saw it as purely content-based.
Nor did it choose to recognize that monopoly status places Con-
solidated Edison on a different footing than a corporation. Rather
it applied the compelling state interest test, as it would to any
regulation of the expression of individuals or corporations, after
having first decided that the ban was not a permissible subject
matter regulation. It is the position of this article that even fol-
lowing the stringent compelling state interest test, the Commis-
sion's ban on bill inserts on controversial topics could have been
upheld.
B. Permissible Subject Matter Regulation
For a regulation to be a valid time, place, or manner restriction,
the court states that as a prerequisite to validity it must be "appli-
cable to all speech irrespective of content."45 Mr. Justice Stevens
wrote a concurring opinion in which he made pointed reference to
Mr. Justice Powell's sweeping generality that there may not be
such a restriction placed on speech.46 He stated:
Any student of history who has been reprimanded for talking about the
World Series during a class discussion of the First Amendment knows
that it is incorrect to state that a time, place, or manner restriction may
not be based upon either the content or subject matter of speech.4 7
The regulation, however, may be based on the content as long as
the limitation is reasonable and justified by significant state con-
cerns. 48 Lehman v. Shaker Heights shows that the rule of content
neutrality-that speech may not be regulated solely on content-
weighs the First Amendment rights of an intruder. Id. at 748. Although the major-
ity dismisses it and the dissent overlooks it, this is one of the propositions on
which this author believes this case should rest. See Rowan v. Post Office Depart-
ment, 397 U.S. 728 (1970); note 65, infra.
44. See note 33 supra and accompanying text.
45. 100 S. Ct. at 2331.
46. Id. at 2332.
47. Id. at 2337 (Stevens, J., concurring in the judgment).
48. Lehman v. Shaker Heights, 418 U.S. 298 (1974). In Lehman, the Court up-
held the refusal of a municipal transit system to allow a political candidate to buy
advertising space on public transportation while allowing commercial advertising.
The basis of the decision was that public transit advertising was not an ap-
propriate first amendment forum and as such, minimizing the appearance of polit-
ical favoritism, the abuse of which could result from allowing political ads on
public transit, and the risk of imposing these views on a captive audience, were
concerns portraying a compelling state interest.
1096
[Vol. 8: 1087, 19811 First Amendment Extension
PEPPERDINE LAW REVIEW
does not truly exist.49 The Court attacked the Commission's can-
did admission that the regulation against the inserts was based
on their controversial nature.5 0 Even though the Commission as-
serted that the ban was not content-based because all viewpoints
on a controversial issue were banned from that particular fo-
rum,5 1 the Court ignored this view. In this way the Court avoided
judging the ban as a valid time, place, or manner regulation.5 2
C. Narrowly Tailored Means of Serving A Compelling State
Interest
The Court recognized that subject matter regulations have been
approved when the government bars the speech from its own fa-
cilities as being too disruptiveS3 of the legitimate purpose for
which the facility had been dedicated.54 The Commission's ban, it
was held by the Court, was based on no such legitimate state in-
terest and neither Greer v. Spock nor Lehman v. Shaker Heights
applied55 because in both cases, a private party had sought to use
public facilities of the state to exercise their expression. In the
instant case, the Court felt that Consolidated Edison sought only
to use its private billing envelopes to proselytize. The Court did
not accept the assertion by the Public Service Commission56 and
the dissent,5 7 that although the billing envelopes emanate from
Consolidated Edison, the costs of the envelope and the postage
are passed along to the utility's customers5 8 who, in that sense,
49. Note, Constitutional Law-First Amendment-Content Neutrality, 28 CASE
W. RES. L. REV. 456, 478 (1977).
50. 100 S. Ct. at 2333.
51. See notes 41-44 supra and accompanying text.
52. "Governmental action that regulates speech on the basis of its subject
matter 'slip [ s I from the neutrality of time, place, and circumstance into a concern
about content."' Id. at 2332. See also Police Department v. Mosley, 408 U.S. 92, 99
(1972).
53. Greer v. Spock, 424 U.S. 828 (1976), see note 55 infra; Lehman v. Shaker
Heights, see 418 U.S. 298 (1974) note 48 supra.
54. 100 S. Ct. at 2333.
55. In Greer v. Spock, 424 U.S. 828 (1976), it was held that partisan speech on a
controversial topic could be prohibited on a military base. In Lehman v. Shaker
Heights, 418 U.S. 298 (1974), the speech was prohibited on a municipal transit sys-
tem. See note 48 supra.
56. 100 S. Ct. at 2336.
57. Id. at 2342 (Blackmun, J., dissenting).
58. See, Comment, supra note 21, at 714, which states that a utility's rate
formula is:
(RATE BASE X RATE OF RETURN)
+
1097
"own" the envelopes. 5 9 The Court was not persuaded by the argu-
ment that Consolidated Edison is a state-created monopoly60 and,
because of this, broad regulation is "necessary to protect the con-
sumer from exploitation." 61
In contrast, the dissent felt that the state does, indeed, have a
compelling interest in seeing that the monopoly powers it be-
stowed on'the utility, including having provided it with a broad-
based captive audience, are not abused. The compelling state in-
terests evident in Lehman apply with equal force regarding the
Commission's ban on topical inserts in utility bills.
Another compelling state interest recognized as substantial by
the State Court of Appeals 62 was that the bill inserts intruded
upon the right of privacy of Consolidated Edison's customers.
The dissent did not deal with this argument at all since it felt the
entire case should have rested upon the "forced subsidy" issue.63
The Court dismissed the consumer's right to privacy with all
the solicitude Marie Antoinette exercised in dealing with her sub-
jects. "The customer of Consolidated Edison may escape expo-
sure to objectionable material simply by transferring the bill
insert from the envelope to wastebasket." 64 The Court refused to
apply a "captive audience" 65 label to the ratepayers. While it fully
OPERATING EXPENSES = REVENUE
Operating expenses are described as cost of labor, maintenance, materials and
supplies (including the rate envelope and postage and all other expenses incurred
in sending out the bill including costs of preparation of the inserts themselves).
59. See note 5 supra.
60. See notes 4 and 5, supra.
61. Cantor v. Detroit Edison Co., 428 U.S. 579, 596 (1976). "[P]ublic utility reg-
ulation typically assumes that the private firm is a natural monopoly and that pub-
lic controls are necessary to protect the consumer from exploitation." Id. at 595-96.
See also 79 Misc. 2d 600, 360 N.Y.S.2d 552.
62. 47 N.Y.2d 94, 390 N.E.2d 749, 41 N.Y.S.2d 30 (1979).
63. 100 S. Ct. at 2339 (Blackmun, J., dissenting).
64. Id. at 2335-36.
65. Content regulation on the premise that the message offends an audience is
allowed primarily on the theory that it is a captive audience whose "substantial
privacy interests are being invaded in an essentially intolerable manner." Cohen
v. California, 403 U.S. 15, 21 (1971). In Cohen, the Court reversed a conviction of
breach of the peace for walking through a courthouse corridor wearing a jacket
bearing the words, "Fuck the Draft." The Court found that a substantial privacy
interest had not been invaded since people are essentially captives being sub-
jected to objectionable speech outside their homes but can "effectively avoid fur-
ther bombardment of their sensibilities simply by averting their eyes." Id. at 21.
The Court, however, has consistently recognized that "government may properly
act in many situations to prohibit intrusion into the privacy of the home of unwel-
come views and ideas which cannot be totally banned from the public dialogue."
Id. In Rowan v. Post Office Department, 397 U.S. 728 (1970), the Court upheld the
constitutionality of Title I of the Postal Revenue and Federal Salary Act of 1967,
39 U.S.C. § 4009, under which a person desiring not to receive pandering or ob-
scene mail in his own home may require the Post Office to order such a mailer to
remove the householder's name from its mailing lists and cease all future mailings
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recognized that "where a single speaker communicates to many
listeners, the First Amendment does not permit the government
to prohibit speech as intrusive unless the 'captive' audience can-
not avoid objectionable speech,"66 the Court flatly admonished
the recipients (after they have already read or at least glanced at
the material in their own homes, usually the last bastion of pri-
vacy) to "avert their eyes." 67
The Court, then cited Rowan v. Post Office Department68 and
acknowledged the "special privacy interests that attach to per-
sons who seek seclusion within their homes." 69 But, thereafter,
the Court turned its back on the consumers by analogizing the ar-
rival of the bill and inserts inside the home, to the arrival of a
door-to-door solicitor at its threshold.70
In Martin v. Struthers,71 regarding the issue of privacy, the
Court rejected an ordinance forbidding any person from attempt-
ing to summon any occupant of a residence to the door of that
residence for the purpose of distributing handbills or circulars of
religious significance. The Court recognized that in the case of
door-to-door solicitation the privacy of the home need not be in-
truded upon unless the resident chooses to admit the solicitor.72
In balancing the interests between the annoyance to the house-
holder of an intrusion at his doorstep and the free dissemination
of thoughts and ideas of the religious canvasser, the Court found
to that person. The Court felt that being "captives outside the sanctuary of the
home and subject to objectionable speech. . . does not mean we must be captives
everywhere." Id. at 738. 'The ancient concept that 'a man's home is his castle'
into which 'not even the king may enter' has lost none of its vitality ... ." Id. at
737. See note 43 supra.
66. 100 S. Ct. at 2335. But cf. Gitlow v. New York, 268 U.S. at 667 in which it
was stated that "a State in the exercise of its police power may punish those who
abuse this freedom by utterances inimical to the public welfare, tending to corrupt
public morals, incite to crime, or disturb the peace ......
67. Cohen v. California, 403 U.S. 15 (1971). See note 65, supra.
68. 100 S. Ct. at 2336 n.11.
69. 397 U.S. 728 (1970). See note 63 supra.
70. Martin v. Struthers, 319 U.S. 141 (1943), in which door to door solicitation
was held not to violate the right of privacy of a person in his home because the
invasion was not substantial enough.
71. Id.
72. The dangers of distribution can so easily be controlled by traditional
legal methods, leaving to each householder the full right to decide
whether he will receive strangers as visitors, that stringent prohibition can
serve no purpose but that forbidden by the Constitution, the naked re-
striction of the dissemination of ideas.
319 U.S. at 147.
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the slight annoyance inconsequential compared with the possibil-
ity of cutting off the free flow of expression.
II. ANALYSIS OF THE MAJORITY OPINION
Looking at the situation presented by the instant case, the
Court of Appeals of New York73 saw, not the inconsequential an-
noyance of Martin v. Struthers, but an intrusion comparable to
that of the obscene mail in Rowan. 74 This intrusion must be ex-
amined in depth.
Customers of Consolidated Edison are largely householders.
They receive their bills monthly and, a fortiori, receive these in-
serts monthly along with the bills. Consolidated Edison's bills,
along with their inserts, do not courteously stop at the door and
ring the bell.75 They come unceremoniously into the home with-
out permission, and unlike the householder in Rowan,7 6 the recip-
ient has no choice but to admit them. Once in the home the
consumer opens the envelope. In it he finds (1) a bill, (2) another
envelope in which to return payment, and (3) additional printed
matter-the inserts. The consumer receives a service from Con-
solidated Edison. Naturally and normally he would think that the
additional printed material would pertain to the service he is re-
ceiving.77 As such, the average consumer will at least begin to
read the "literature" and might well be offended by its intrusion
into his home. The offense and the intrusion has already been
committed. The "wastebasket" escape envisioned by the Court
does not eradicate so substantial an invasion into the privacy of
the home.
A. The Right to be Let Alone
"The issue of whether there is a right to be free from speech
poses a sharp conflict between freedom of speech, on the one
hand, and privacy, on the other."7 8 The right of privacy does not
73. 47 N.Y.2d at 106, 390 N.E.2d at 755, 417 N.Y.S.2d at 36-37. The court felt that
consumers of utility services were destined to have contact with everything in the
billing envelopes and that the inserts, therefore, violated the impenetrable privacy
barrier which surrounds the home.
74. 397 U.S. 728. See note 65 supra and accompanying text.
75. See notes 70-72 supra and accompanying text.
76. See note 65 supra and accompanying text.
77. As a ratepayer of a utility one reasonably assumes that any communica-
tion in the rate envelope would relate to the service received, e.g., a cut-off notice
or notification that the utility's rates were going up again.
78. Haiman, Speech v. Privacy: Is There a Right Not To Be Spoken To?, 67 Nw.
U.L. REV. 153, 154 (1972). [Hereinafter cited as Speech v. Privacy]. See also,
Black, He Cannot Choose But Hear: The Plight of the Captive Auditor, 53 COL. L.
REV. 960, 967 (1953): "What is perfectly clear is that the claim to freedom from un-
wanted speech rests on grounds of high policy and in convictions of human dignity
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come directly from a specific provision of the Bill of Rights. It has
been inferred from the common law and by judicial decision from
the penumbras of the first, third, fourth, fifth and ninth Amend-
ments.79 It has been held to be a right so fundamental that the
framers did not feel its inclusion along with the enumerated liber-
ties to be necessary.80
The law was slow to develop. "[I]n very early times, the law
gave a remedy only for physical interference with life and prop-
erty .... Gradually the scope of these legal rights broadened,
and now the right to life has come to mean the right to enjoy
life-the right to be let alone .... "81 Since 1890, when Samuel
Warren and Louis Brandeis wrote their famous law review article
which gave significance to the tort of defamation, our society has
undergone a myriad of changes giving rise to a need for even
more protection by the right of privacy than those noted writers
envisioned.8 2
In their many decisions protecting the rights of criminals, the
Warren court took major steps to ensure that the right of privacy
was protected.83 The Court found that there were zones of pri-
vacy created by a person where a reasonable expectation of pri-
vacy could be inferred.84 The Burger court enhanced the concept
and reinforced the Court's high regard for the sanctity of the
home by holding that a warrantless arrest, absent exigent circum-
stances, may not be made in a suspect's home. 85 The Court re-
closely similar to if not identical with those classically brought forward in support
of freedom of speech in the usual sense."
79. Griswold v. Connecticut, 381 U.S. 479, 484 (1975). In Griswold the court es-
tablished a "zone of privacy created by several fundamental constitutional guaran-
tees," and struck down a law which prohibited the use of contraceptives by
married couples, basing its rationale on this right of privacy. Id. at 485.
80. Id. at 488-93 (Goldberg, J., concurring).
81. Warren & Brandeis, The Right to Privacy, 4 HARv. L. REV. 193 (1890).
82. In recent decades, the population growth coupled with the trend
towards greater urbanization, have combined to crowd us all closer to-
gether, and to make it more difficult to live in isolation from possibly un-
wanted communications of our fellow men. At the same time, the
increasing extent to which speech has become militant and abrasive has
led its sometimes reluctant hearers to yearn for "freedom from speech"
rather than "freedom of speech."
Speech v. Privacy, supra note 78, at 153.
83. See, e.g., Katz v. U.S., 389 U.S. 347 (1967).
84. In Katz there was a reasonable expectation of privacy in a public tele-
phone booth during a private conversation where the doors of the booth were
closed.
85. Payton v. New York, 445 U.S. 573 (1980).
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quired a warrant for arrest in the suspect's home because it
understood that nowhere "is the zone of privacy more clearly de-
fined than when bounded by the unambiguous physical terms of
an individual's home."8 6 This simply reinforces many past deci-
sions in criminal and non-criminal cases which regarded the
home as a citadel against substantial invasions of privacy.87 The
Court chose, in this case, to open the doors of the home to such
an inescapable invasion,8 8 justifying its holding, although it is
never expressly stated as such, by expanding first amendment
protection to include monopolies.
The Court did not find that the Public Service Commission had
a compelling state interest in regulating the inserts of Consoli-
dated Edison. The Court noted that if there were a compelling
state interest, "it is possible that the State could achieve its goal
simply by requiring Consolidated Edison to stop sending bill in-
serts to the homes of objecting customers." 89 Requiring Consoli-
dated Edison to omit its objecting customers from the insert
mailing is possible but would not alleviate the forced subsidy en-
tirely. The cost of the inserts which still go out will be passed
along to all of Consolidated Edison's ratepayers, not just those
who want to receive them.90 In view of the fact that all costs of
the corporation's political speech should be borne solely by the
shareholders and charged to an income account, 91 this alternative
86. Id. at 589.
87. Erznoznik v. City of Jacksonville, 422 U.S. 205 (1975), in which an ordi-
nance allowing suppression as a nuisance of any movie containing nudity which is
visible from a public place was held offensive to first amendment rights because it
was overbroad. The Court stated, however, that "[s]uch selective restrictions
have been upheld only when the speaker intrudes on the privacy of the home."
Id. at 209. In Rowan v. Post Office Department, the Court is most eloquently em-
phatic about privacy in the home and is on point with the instant case:
In today's complex society we are inescapably captive audiences for many
purposes, but a sufficient measure of individual autonomy must survive to
permit every householder to exercise control over unwanted mail ....
[I]t seems to us that a mailer's right to communicate must stop at the
mailbox of an unreceptive addressee .... If this prohibition operates to
impede the flow of even valid ideas, the answer is that no one has a right
to press even good ideas on an unwilling recipient.
397 U.S. at 736-38. See also, Stanley v. Georgia, 394 U.S. 557 (1969); see note 10
supra. In Public Utilities Commission v. Pollak, 343 U.S. 451, 464 (1952) a regula-
tion of the Public Utilities Commission of the District of Columbia which allowed
music and commercial messages to be piped into public transit vehicles was up-
held, the Court stating that the right of privacy of a passenger on a public vehicle
does not equal "the privacy to which he is entitled in his own home." Id. at 464.
88. See notes 75-77 and accompanying text, supra.
89. 100 S. Ct. at 2336 n.11.
90. See note 58 supra.
91. Southwestern Electric Power Co. v. Federal Power Commission, 304 F.2d
29 (5th Cir. 1962) cert. denied, 371 U.S. 924 (1962). Cf. Cammarano v. U.S., 358 U.S.
498 (1959), which upheld disallowance of ordinary and necessary business expense
deductions for grass-roots lobbying, and Buckley v. Valeo, 424 U.S. 1 (1976), which
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suggested by the Court is not viable. Alternatively, they sug-
gested that the Public Service Commission might lawfully order
Consolidated Edison to include inserts of opposing viewpoints.
This overlooked the rationale on which the Commission turned
down the very same request from the NRDC. The Commission
ruled that the content of the insert makes no difference, it could
be pro or con, it is the protection of the privacy of the consumer
in his home which is paramount. 92
The Commission's ban on bill inserts did not preclude Consoli-
dated Edison from speaking, but left open alternative means of
communicating these ideas. That other modes of speech which
remain available may be more costly is not determinative where
the offending party has failed to demonstrate that this regulation
will, in effect, wholly preclude it from exercising its rights.93 Con-
solidated Edison may advertise its views on public issues on tele-
vision or radio, in newspapers or magazines, on billboards or by
skywriting. These channels of communication, albeit more costly,
struck down limits on individual political campaign contributions while approving
limitations on political contributions made by a corporation. "It is the right of the
viewers and listeners, not the right of the broadcasters, which is paramount." Red
Lion Broadcasting Co. v. FCC, 395 U.S. 367, 390 (1969). Red Lion involved a chal-
lenge to the FCC's "fairness doctrine" which required that each broadcaster must
give fair coverage to each side of a public issue presented or the broadcaster
would lose his license. The Court upheld the "fairness doctrine" as not violative of
the first amendment rights of public broadcasters and consistent with the first
amendment rights of the public. "Otherwise station owners and a few networks
would have unfettered power to make time available only to the highest bidders,
to communicate only their own views on public issues, people and candidates, and
to permit on the air only those with whom they agreed." Id. at 392.
In Columbia Broadcasting System v. Democratic National Committee, 412 U.S.
94 (1973), utilizing the same rationale that the rich could command the lise of the
airwaves if allowed unfettered freedom, the Court held that a broadcaster was not
compelled to accept paid editorial advertisements, stating, "[blecause the broad-
cast media utilizes a valuable and limited public resource, there is also present an
unusual order of First Amendment values." Id. at 101.
In much the same way that Red Lion and Columbia Broadcasting System rely
on the scarcity of broadcast frequency to balance the scale of first amendment val-
ues, so, too, should the Court in the instant case have done. Consolidated Edison,
by sending its messages along with its bills to every household and business in
New York City, certainly has a valuable and scarce channel of communication
which is closed to most since the cost of such a mailing would be prohibitive,
whereas Consolidated Edison passes it on to its consumers.
92. See notes 65-77 supra and accompanying text.
93. Kovacs v. Cooper, 366 U.S. 77 (1948), in which the Court upheld an ordi-
nance prohibiting the use of sound tracks on public streets and thoroughfares for
dissemination of items of news and public concern as merely regulatory as op-
posed to a prohibition since "[s]ound trucks may be utilized in places such as
parks or other open spaces off the streets." Id. at 85.
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are not banned by the order of the Public Service Commission.
Therefore, the Commission's order, in addition to being a reason-
able time, place, or manner restriction,94 is also an effective, nar-
rowly drawn restriction justified by a compelling state interest.95
The Court, however, did not accept as persuasive the argu-
ments put forth to show that the Public Service Commission had
a compelling interest in restricting Consolidated Edison's use of
the rate envelopes to disseminate its political, economic and so-
cial points of view. The Court found that the right of privacy in-
volved was not substantial enough to deprive the utility of its free
speech. 96
III. THE DISSENTING OPINION
While being very careful to reaffirm his strong sensitivity to the
protection of free speech "by the First and Fourteenth Amend-
ments against repression by the State,"97 Justice Blackmun bal-
anced the interests involved in this case and could not find a
violation of Consolidated Edison's right to freedom of speech. Of
paramount importance to the dissent was the fact that Consoli-
dated Edison is a utility sanctioned by the State of New York.98
Because of this monopoly status and Consolidated Edison's rate
structure,99 "the use of the insert amounts to an exaction from the
utility's customers by way of forced aid for the utility's speech."loo
The legislature of the State of New York foresaw that the sanc-
tioned monopoly status of a utility might lead to excess and abuse
and saw fit to arm the Public Service Commission with broad
powers. 0 1
Under the law of the State of New York, the Public Service
94. See notes 33-44 supra and accompanying text.
95. Since the restriction does not proscribe Consolidated Edison's speech, see
note 92 supra and accompanying text, and the forced subsidy could not be elimi-
nated without banning the bill inserts, the restriction is as narrowly drawn as pos-
sible.
The compelling state interests involved are the substantial privacy rights of the
utility's ratepayers, see notes 74-87, supra, and the protection of their right of free
association by preventing a forced subsidy of Consolidated Edison's opinions, see
notes 98-107 infra and accompanying text.
96. But see notes 64-67 and accompanying text, supra.
97. 100 S. Ct. at 2339 (Blackmun, J., dissenting).
98. N.Y. PUB. SERV. LAw § 68 (McKinney 1955).
99. See note 58 supra.
100. 100 S. Ct. at 2339 (Blackmun, J., dissenting).
101. "This exceptional grant of power to private enterprises justifies extensive
oversight on the part of the State to protect the ratepayers from exploitation of the
monopoly power through excessive rates and other forms of overreaching." 100 S.
Ct. at 2340 (Blackmun, J., dissenting).
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Commission can regulate the rates utilities may charge.102 The
Public Service Commission has authorized that a utility's rates
may reflect only the costs of providing necessary services to its
customers plus a reasonable rate of return to its shareholders. 1 03
"The entire bill payment system-meters, meter readings, bill
mailings and bill inserts-are paid by the customers under Com-
mission rules permitting recovery of necessary operating ex-
penses.' 04 Since the customers are paying for the inserts, it is a
forced subsidy for the promulgation of the utility's beliefs. A pub-
lic utility cannot include in its rate base, and therefore pass on to
its customers, the costs of political advertising and lobbying, but
must pass these costs along entirely to its shareholders.10 5 The
benefit derived from the inserts is a furtherance of Consolidated
Edison's business interests. (It cannot seriously be contended
that the promotion of nuclear power is a public issue which in no
way effects the utility). As such, the inserts constitute non-trade
advertising, and cost for this should not be borne by the ratepay-
ers "because they derive no service-related benefit from it."106
According to the dissent, to do otherwise would be a forced sub-
sidy, a fortiori, a compelled association with the utility's beliefs in
violation of the first amendment's guarantee of freedom of associ-
ation. 0 7
The Court has, in the past, decided a line of cases dealing with
violations of the freedom of association, beginning with Railway
Employees' Department v. Hanson. 08 Although Hanson was de-
cided on other grounds, the question upon which the Court ex-
102. See note 5, supra.
103. See note 58, supra.
104. 100 S. Ct. at 2340 (Blackmun, J., dissenting).
105. Southwestern Electric Power Co. v. Federal Power Commission, 304 F.2d
29 (5th Cir. 1962), in which a regulation by the Federal Power Commission requir-
ing that utilities keep books indicating that the costs of advertisements are paid
out of corporate funds, not subsidized by the consumer, was upheld as not violat-
ing the utility's First Amendment rights. See also Cammarano v. United States,
358 U.S. 498 (1959).
106. 304 F.2d 29.
107. See notes 108-18 infra and accompanying text.
108. 351 U.S. 225 (1956). In Hanson the Court upheld a union shop agreement
requiring financial support for a collective bargaining agency by all those who re-
ceived the benefits of its work. This was viewed as being within the power of Con-
gress to order. The Court, however, reserved judgment regarding the violation of
the rights to freedom of conscience, freedom of association and freedom of
thought protected by the first and fifth amendments because they were not part of
the record of the immediate case. The rights were presented by the union as hav-
ing placed ideological and political restrictions on its members by using their dues
to finance political causes.
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pressly reserved judgment therein was presented in Machinists v.
Street, 0 9 which held a forced subsidy of a union's political views
unconstitutional. Justice Douglas, in a concurring opinion, agreed
with the Court's denial of the Union's authority to spend an em-
ployee's money for political causes which he opposed, on the
ground that while a union shop agreement constitutes a com-
pelled association for the benefit of the employee and as such
must be upheld, employees must be protected against compelled
financing of the union's political beliefs:
Once an association with others is compelled by the facts of life, special
safeguards are necessary lest the spirit of the First, Fourth, and Fifth
Amendments be lost and we all succumb to regimentation .... If an as-
sociation is compelled, the individual should not be forced to surrender
any matters of conscience, belief or expression. He should be allowed to
enter the group with his own flag flying .... and he should not be re-
quired to finance the promotion of causes with which he disagrees. 110
In the instant case, the association of the ratepayers with Consoli-
dated Edison is compelled by the State of New York which per-
mits that company and other utilities to operate as monopolies
because it has determined that "the public interest is better
served by protecting them from competition.""' The designation
of a union as exclusive representative carries with it great respon-
sibilities,112 and an analogy can be made between the union in
Machinists v. Street and the monopolistic utility in the instant
case. Arguably, Consolidated Edison cannot prevent those who
are forced to associate with it from refusing to associate with its
political and ideological beliefs.113
What Justice Blackmun and Justice Rehnquist, who joined the
109. 367 U.S. 740 (1960). In Machinists, the Court refused to uphold a provision
of a union shop agreement which required all employees to join the union and pay
dues which were thereafter used by the union "in a substantial part ... to finance
the campaigns of candidates for federal and state offices whom [some of the union
members] opposed, and to promote the propagation of political and economic con-
cepts and ideologies with which [they] disagreed." Id. at 744.
110. 367 U.S. at 776 (Douglas, J., concurring). See Elrod v. Burns, 427 U.S. 347
(1976), in which the Court held violative of the first amendment freedom of associ-
ation the practice of dismissals of employees for the sole reason that they were
not affiliated with the Democratic party; Perry v. Sindermann, 408 U.S. 593 (1972),
in which the Court affirmed a reversal of a summary judgment to allow a professor
to show that, although untenured and therefore without an expectancy of re-
turning to the same position the next school year, he was not, in fact, rehired be-
cause he publicly criticized the college's administration in violation of his first
amendment freedoms of speech and association; Keyishian v. Board of Regents,
385 U.S. 589 (1967), in which required adherence to a broadly worded teacher's loy-
alty oath was held violative of the freedom of association.
111. 100 S. Ct. at 2341 (Blackmun, J., dissenting).
112. Abood v. Detroit Board of Education, 431 U.S. 209 (1977), in which the
Court prohibited the part of a union shop agreement requiring members to pay
fees which will in part be used to contribute to political candidates and further
political views which the union, not its individual members, supported.
113. Id. at 234-35.
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dissent, recognized and the majority ignored is that Consolidated
Edison, in its status as monopoly, is the exclusive source of power
for residents of New York City and the surrounding areas. Most
of its customers are apartment dwellers who have no option but
to remain its customers since they have no voice in what type of
gas and electric service they receive. Other than equipping a
structure with solar reflectors or using candles to illuminate one's
home or office, there is no way to totally escape the utility's power
in New York City. "Compulsion which comes from circumstances
can be as real as compulsion which comes from a command."'114
Just as the streetcar riders in Public Utilities Commission v. Pol-
lak"15 and in Lehman 1 6 were there "as a matter of necessity, not
of choice," 1 7 so, too, were Consolidated Edison's customers a cap-
tive audience. The dissent recognized that the consumers here
have no choice but to use the utility's service and no choice,
therefore, but to receive their billing envelopes. They were a cap-
tive audience for the inserts espousing the utility's views on con-
troversial issues with which some did not agree. The dissent was
incredulous of the Court's approval to an enforced subsidy.11 8
Justice Blackmun often has recognized the "ivory tower" stance
of the Court. In his harsh dissent in Harris v. McRae,119 he re-
buked his brethren in the majority who upheld the Hyde Amend-
ment, thereby cutting off Federal funding for medically necessary
abortions. He quoted in part from his dissents in Beal v. Doe,12 0
Maher v. Roe 12' and Poelker v. Doe:' 22 "There is 'condescension'
in the Court's holding 'that she may go elsewhere .. . , this is
114. Public Utilities Commission v. Pollak, 343 U.S. at 468 (Douglas, J., dissent-
ing). See note 87, supra. Note that in this case, the Court, whose members pre-
sumably do not use public transportation in the District of Columbia, held that
riders on the public transportation system who were subjected to music, an-
nouncements, and commercials broadcast into the streetcars through a loud-
speaker were not a captive audience. Mr. Justice Douglas, feet planted on terra
firma, realized that it is possible to say that "[I]n one sense it can be said that
those who ride the streetcars do so voluntarily. Yet in a practical sense they are
forced to ride, since this mode of transportation is today essential for many
thousands." Id.
115. 343 U.S. 451. See notes 87 and 114 supra.
116. 418 U.S. 298. See note 48 supra.
117. See note 114 supra.
118. 100 S. Ct. at 2339 (Blackmun, J., dissenting).
119. 100 S. Ct. 2671 (1980).
120. 432 U.S. 438 (1977).
121. 432 U.S. 464 (1977).
122. 432 U.S. 519 (1977).
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'disingenuous and alarming' . . . , there truly is 'another world'
out there the existence of which the Court, I suspect, either
chooses to ignore or fears to recognize."123
IV. IMPACT OF THE CASE
The immediate impact of the Court's decision is to put a mo-
nopoly on an equal footing with an ordinary corporation or an in-
dividual vis-a-vis the protection accorded its freedom of speech.
It is a vital fact that the monopoly status of Consolidated Edison
puts it in a unique position, quite unlike the corporation or the in-
dividual, of having a captive audience into whose homes it can
send its message in the form of bill inserts. Any monopoly holds
the captive attention of any parties who by necessity must seek
its goods and services.
The Court reached its decision despite the fact that it had been
well-settled that the householder could protect himself against re-
ceiving undesirable information within the confines of his
home.' 24 It is also within the power of the State to shut off dis-
course "upon a showing that substantial privacy interests are be-
ing invaded in an essentially intolerable manner." 125 The
invasion of privacy within the home, surely a substantial privacy
interest,126 has been invaded by the Court's decision in this case.
The Court refused to balance this substantial interest against the
type of self-serving speech in which Consolidated Edison was en-
gaging.
If the Court continues to apply the stringent compelling state
interest test in future cases, which pits the rights of individuals
against first amendment rights of monopolies, we can look for-
ward to an erosion of individual freedoms and an assault upon
our homes by service monopolies with such easy access. In addi-
tion to the power company, the phone company will have our ear
through their billing envelopes. We will be open to unwanted
manifestos and treatises from our water company. A consumer
simply cannot tell these utilities that he no longer wishes to re-
ceive their bills. Their services are necessary and there is no-
where else to turn. The home will no longer be a sanctuary, it will
be a public forum.
If the Court had deemed the Public Service Commission's ban
on bill inserts as a reasonable time, place, or manner regulation
we would not feel so exposed to bill insert messages in our
123. Harris v. McRae, 100 S. Ct. 2701, 2711-12 (1980).
124. See, e.g., Rowan v. Post Office Department, 397 U.S. 728 (1970).
125. Cohen v. California, 403 U.S. at 21. See note 65 supra.
126. See notes 85-87 supra and accompanying text.
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homes. The Court seems to be too preoccupied with protecting
First Amendment rights despite the reality of the outcome. Per-
haps if the monopoly aspect is stressed more, the Court will dif-
ferentiate between it and an ordinary corporation, and limit its
first amendment rights as a necessary adjunct to limitations al-
ready imposed on other rights of monopolies.
V. CONCLUSION
This case required a balancing of interests between the free-
dom of speech of Consolidated Edison, a monopoly utility, on one
hand, and the right of privacy of its consumers on the other. The
Court chose to give cursory review to certain vital circumstances
of the particular case and treated the monopoly as equal with or-
dinary corporations and individuals. As a result, they crossed the
First Amendment finishing line in favor of the monopoly with
blinding speed, if not spellbinding grace.
The Court seems to have accorded first amendment protection
to monopolies without expressly recognizing that they were doing
so. Perhaps the majority felt that since protection had already
been extended to the speech of corporations in First National
Bank of Boston v. Bellotti,127 and a monopoly is also a corpora-
tion, it was not extending first amendment protection any further.
The Court's only reference to Consolidated Edison's monopoly
status is in a footnote likening it to the protected speech of "heav-
ily regulated businesses."'128
It is possible that the Court did not want to rule on the issue at
this juncture. The problem of understanding the Court's ruling is
not a new one:
Relying on the existence of familiar methods of dealing with certain types
of problems, the Court can hold that the government has adopted overly
repressive means with some confidence that it has not ventured onto a
127. See note 18, supra.
128. 100 S. Ct. at 2331 n.l. The Court likened Consolidated Edison's speech to
information regarding the type of services offered by optometrists in Friedman v.
Rogers, 440 U.S. 1 (1979), and the prices charged by pharmacists in Virginia State
Board of Pharmacy v. Virginia Consumer's Council, 425 U.S. 748 (1976). But in
both those cases the speech protected was information. It dealt specifically with
the goods aad services offered rather than with controversial issues. In addition,
"heavily regulated businesses" is not synonymous with monopolies. Although the
businesses may be heavily regulated they are comprised of many individual com-
panies and the public has the freedom to choose whether to use one or any of
them. There is no such freedom of choice when dealing with a monopoly, such as
Consolidated Edison, which supplies essential goods or services.
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limb. In cases where traditional legal methods are not visible in the fore-
ground, or where the statute cannot be narrowed on its face, the Court
often uses some other-possibly concealed-route to its result: it ques-
tions the state's intent, it applies a per se rule of absolute protection, it
caves in to its own political necessity or it discovers that the first amend-
ment does not apply to the situation at hand.
1 2 9
This case provided an appropriate forum in which the Court
could have recognized that a monopoly requires a greater duty
imposed upon it than an individual or a corporation to prevent it
from exploiting those who have no choice but to accept its serv-
ices or products. The Court's failure to so hold reinforces Justice
Blackmun's observation of the Court's ivory tower attitude.
LYNN K. WARREN
129. Note, Less Drastic Means and the First Amendment, 78 YALE L.J. 464, 472-
73 (1969).
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